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SYMPOSIUM

THIRD ANNUAL LATIN AMERICAN

COMPETITION AND TRADE ROUND
TABLE
A NEO-INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF
VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS FOR ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT IN DEVELOPING

COUNTRIES
Ignacio de Le6n*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Conventionally, social scientists examine the reality of
developing countries in order to emphasize the existence of
special traits and features in those societies that deserve special attention. The aftermath of this analytical exercise is the
development of ad-hoc normative principles guiding policy enforcement. The conclusion, according to which developing countries need "stronger" competition enforcement, is a sub-product
of the assumption whereby market failures and resource
misallocation is more severe compared to other countries. Asking the question whether some special competition principles
should apply to the case of developing countries reveals this
analytical bias.

* The author is a Ph.D - M.Phil (University College London), LL.M (QMWLon.), and an LL.B. (Catholic Univ. Caracas).
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This paper contends that before examining whether social
resource allocation in developing countries is "worse," and
whether special competition policy principles should apply to
correct the failures, it is important to bear in mind the limitations within which the analysis is made. To begin, the assessment of whether resource allocation is "good" or "bad" is contingent to the existence of an "optimal" resource allocation
against which reality can be compared. Is this possible to do in
the analysis of real markets in order to draw policy conclusions?
The practical impossibility of ascertaining a standard
capable of assessing reality properly, leads to the impossibility
of defining whether certain agreements are competitive restrictive or competitive enhancing. This is particularly relevant in
the analysis of vertical restraints, where the restrictions on
competition are not always considered a welfare loss.' As W.
Comanor and P. Rey assert, "[t]he foreclosure of firms from
upstream suppliers or downstream distributions is a longstanding problem for competition policy. At times, it has been
strongly condemned, but in other periods it has been considered primarily efficiency-enhancing and not challenged at all.
This vacillating approach towards the problem of vertical foreclosure reflected its uncertain treatment in the economic literature. As this treatment has varied, so have policy standards."2
Conventional theory appears to have intrinsic epistemological
limitations in the assessment of reality, leading to the formulation of erratic normative standards, which are in turn reflected
into policy recommendations.3
For these reasons, this paper takes an alternative route.
Rather than assuming the existence of ad hoc traits arising out
of the perceived failures in resource allocation in developing
countries, this work attempts to define an alternative positive
and normative understanding of the nature of firms and markets, leading to different policy recommendations. This paper
argues that the uncertain essence of the business environment
where firms interact in the real world force them to adopt
business strategies that restrict the "freedom" of those econom-

1. See COMPETITION POLICY TowARDs VERTICAL FORECLOSURE IN A GLOBAL
ECONOMY (L. Waverman & W. Comanor eds., 1996).
2. Id.

3. See id.
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ic agents with whom they deal, in order to seize business opportunities which would otherwise remain unexploited, and
would lead to a reduction of social welfare. Therefore, the normative conclusions arising from this analysis do not judge
market allocations by comparing them against ideal optimal
allocations. Instead, they evaluate how conducive institutions
are to enabling entrepreneurs to discover new business opportunities, thereby enhancing social welfare. In essence, this
equation focuses the policy maker's analysis on the importance
of permanent institutional building, rather than on attempting
to intervene in markets whenever they do not replicate "optimal" outcomes.
In this paper, I will explore the problems of vertical integration and the emergence of the firm through the lenses of
neo-institutional economics. In order to examine these problems, I will use the experiences of the Venezuelan beer, pharmaceutical and cold drinks industries.
II. NEO-INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF FIRM INTEGRATION.
Organizations are essential to enable entrepreneurs to
undertake activities that they cannot pursue in isolation.4
However, conventional theory does not fully address the economic tenets and implications of this phenomenon. In particular, they do not explain why firms exist at all and how interfirm division of labor comes about. Instead, it assumes the
existence of given production functions that represent the maximum output obtainable from different input combinations. 5
This representation of productive possibilities neglects the
roles of organization, knowledge, experience and skills. For a
long time, the neo-classical theory of the firm could not render
a plausible explanation of the firm, which remained confined to
a "black box."' Conventional industrial organization regards

4. Organizations are here taken as encompassing any form of inter-firm cooperation among entrepreneuers, regardless of whether they are formalized into
explicit arrangements or not. They include a vast array of corporate structures,
business practices, and patterns of regular behavior.
5. See G.B. Richardson, The Organizationof Industry, 82 THE ECON. J. 887888 (1972).
6. Neo-classical theory was never interested in the nature of the firm, which
was regarded as a sort of anomaly in the market system, whose emergence did
not fit into it basic premises about the interaction between the forces of supply
and demand. As recently as 1981, F. Hahn referred to the firm as a mysterious
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markets and firms incompatible, the latter being considered a
suspicious mechanism whereby entrepreneurs manipulate
otherwise efficient market outcomes. Thus, at the most, neoclassical firms are regarded as, "islands of planned coordination in a sea of market relations."'
Mainstream theories do not acknowledge how
organizations emerge and why, thus hindering a fuller understanding of the causes for the growth of firms, which unquestionably affects the capacity of policy makers to design and
implement competition policy.8 After all, this is a policy that
needs an appreciation of the inner reasons why firms grow and
compete in a market economy. How firms grow and why are
they efficient mechanisms for entrepreneurs to allocate resources in a context of uncertain social relations? What are the
implications of this novel analysis to competition policy, particularly in developing countries?
Thus, in this paper I will explore how, under an alternative institutional viewpoint which emphasizes process and
change, market arrangements currently prohibited or restricted by antitrust statutes appear to be the very expression
of different degrees of co-ordination, the efficiency of which becomes evident in the long-run. In the light of these alternative

entity. See F. Hahn, General Equilibrium Theory, in THE CRISIS IN ECONOMIC
THEORY 131 (D. Bell and I. Kristol eds., Basic Books 1981). The neo-classical theory of the firm does not examine its nature and therefore leaves many aspects in
the dark.
7. This expression was coined by G.B. Richardson, following the findings
made by R. Coase about the nature of the firm. See Richardson, supra note 5, at
883; R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA N.S. 380, 386-405 (1937).
In this work, Coase argued that firms emerged whenever using the market system
in order to obtain inputs is more expensive than planning, due to the existence of
transaction costs. These costs of doing business force entrepreneurs to organize
production through hierarchy rather than by resorting to market exchanges. However, still in the 197 0 's, Coase protested for the lack of attention by mainstream
scholars to the essence of his insights, arguing that his paper often had been
quoted, yet little understood. See Coase, Institutional Structure of Production, in
ESSAYS ON ECONOMICS AND ECONOMISTS 5 (1994).
8. More recent studies in the field of industrial organization regard the firm
as a structure created for the solution of the incentive problem created by the
agent-principal relationship. However, these improvements in the conventional view
still present a faulty explanatory basis for appraising the subjective nature of the
knowledge held by those interacting within firms and market organizations. See N.
FOSS, ON THE RELATIONS BETWEEN EVOLUTIONARY AND CONTRACTUAL THEORIES OF
THE FIRM (Dep't of Indus. Econ. and Strategy, Working Paper No. 97-4, 1997).
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normative standards, we will explore the enforcement experiences in certain, selected Venezuelan industries.
A. The Problem of Co-ordinatingInvestments in Decentralized
Market Settings
Any explanation of market competition and of the reasons
why entrepreneurs may be tempted to restrict it through exclusive dealings and other means must begin with the analysis of
the essence of the market context where entrepreneurs are
required to make investments. Stepping in the shoes of businessmen forces us to consider the elusive environment where
investments are made, which is characterized by sheer uncertainty.
To understand the essence of market uncertainty, consider
the situation where producers are all hit by an increase in
demand. By how much should they increase production? The
information found in other firms' investment decisions which
would be necessary for calculating optimal investments is not
readily available to anyone. Entrepreneurs may conjecture, of
course, but these guesses are dependent upon the estimates of
other firms, which would seem to lead to infinite regression
and sheer uncertainty.9 The transmission of information is
decisive in the functioning of decentralized market systems,
because only in this way can entrepreneurs eliminate their
uncertainty in part, and co-ordinate their activities successfully. In market economies, individuals are independent of central
direction, yet their activities are interrelated by a network of
organizations which allow transmission to occur throughout

9. This is exemplified by Keynes' famous beauty contest. Market knowledge
is not only fragmented but also construed on the subjective basis of "expectations"
pervaded by sheer uncertainty. Keynes demonstrated in his beauty contest example
how mutual expectations lead to the sheer uncertainty that commonly pervades
markets and generally, social life. The speculative nature of the decisions market
participants adopt in their transactions is similar to a beauty contest whose winner is chosen according to the reciprocal expectations of the deciding judges. In
Keynes' example, each judge casts his votes according to what he considers other
members of the jury will decide, but since none of the judges possess certainty as
to the decisions of the rest, he does not possess an objective fact on which to base
his decision either. Each will guess on the basis of everybody else's guessings.
Hence, their decisions will inevitably be based on sheer or genuine uncertainty.
See J.M. KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY
156 (1964).
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the system.'0
In order to make information available, firms engage in a
variety of restrictive conventions, either in contractual form or
simply as self-imposed routines." These restrictions provide
mutual boundaries aimed at providing some chance of predicting the conduct of other businesses with success. 2 These
boundaries also leave open the possibility for businesses to
reconsider their respective positions should new problems
arise. In this way, parties give tentative assurances about their
commitments. Stated differently, organizations enable entrepreneurs a tentative knowledge about the conduct that other
economic agents might pursue; the nature of economic organization is thus decisive in encouraging entrepreneurs to invest. 3 Richardson clearly states this point, which is neglected
by neo-classical "omniscient" models, "[Wihat commonly fails to
be recognized, . . . is that the possibility of forming reliable
expectations is not independent of the particular market conditions which define the model employed. [On the contrary] it is
the availability to entrepreneurs of this information... which
is a function of the nature of the particular form of economic
organization or system within which they are presumed to
operate. [Therefore] the extent to which an entrepreneur can
obtain market information can be shown to depend on the
nature of the prevailing economic organization .... 14
Any forecast of future levels of demand is inevitably imprecise, but that does not relieve firms from committing themselves to investments today to meet future demand. Because
of sheer uncertainty, firms must develop devices to reduce
their uncertainty to a level where they will have sufficient
confidence to make investments. 6 This is important for firms
because once an investment is made, it is unlikely that the
investing firm can withdraw without suffering losses.'" Hence,
managers must be certain that other firms are committed to
what they believe are their commitments; in other words, that

10. See G.B. RICHARDSON, INFOIATION AND INVESTMENT 30 (1960).

11. See id. at 67.
12. See id.
13. Id. at 29.
14. Id. at 29-30.

15. See id. at 52.
16. See RICHARDSON, supra note 10, at 50.
17. See id.
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their expectations will not be frustrated. As Schumpeter contends, "Enterprise would in most cases be impossible if it were
not known from the outset that exceptionally favorable situations are likely to arise which if exploited by price, quality and
quantity manipulation will produce profits adequate to tide
over exceptionally unfavorable situations provided these are
similarly managed." 8 Organizations spring either in the form
of self-imposed routines or through contractual commitments
ensuring that vital information is generated and passed on to
all those involved thus creating such "exceptionally favorable
situations." 9
Firms must know that such favorable conditions will be
"there" when the time comes, otherwise, they will refrain from
investing." Anticipated knowledge in the form of reliable expectations is essential for establishing the present level of
investments that firms are willing to make today to meet future aggregate demand.2 ' But such knowledge does not relate
to "objective" future circumstances which, after all, are pure
speculation; it relates to the subjective perception of the investor that other market participants will have a certain set of
beliefs about what the future will bring.
The volume of investments will ultimately depend not so
much on increases or reductions in future aggregate demand (a
fact that only a prophet could predict), but on the volume of
both competitive and complementary investments that each
firm hopes others will commit today.2 Entrepreneurs do not
know for sure what these volumes are. Even if they communicated their intentions to the rest, others would have to trust
them and align their conduct accordingly. However, trust is not
built on mere communication, for entrepreneurs may be tempted to cheat to obtain an advantage.' Something else is necessary.

18. J. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 89-90 (1942).

19. Id. at 90.
20. See RICHARDSON, supra note 10, at 49
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. This is the classic prisoner's dilemma situation where some parties seek
to gain advantages by cheating the rest. These situations call for intervention to
discipline members of the group. See A. DIXIT AND B.J. NABELUFF, THINKING STRATEGICALLY (1991). The application of game theory models in the law is explored in
D. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW (1994).
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Entrepreneurs speculate about the levels of investment
other firms will make in the event of a foreseen increase or
reduction in future aggregate demand.' For this reason, they
must identify the minimum amount of information required,
and the different conditions which permit access to it. 5
The devices which entrepreneurs employ to gather information may take multiple forms, but what they all have in
common is that they consolidate the expectations of market
participants by reducing their uncertainty to tolerable levels.2" Note that legal formalities represent a mere additional
consideration in the process of building business trust. Explicit
arrangements through which price information is made available to entrepreneurs may take several forms which are either
structured into formal legal arrangements or not. Thus, the
form adopted by organizations does not, in principle, depend on
the legal form chosen by entrepreneurs. Rather, it depends on
the position that each market actor holds vis-A-vis the rest
(both competitors and customers). The goal is to adjust ex-ante
to the behavior of other firms in the system in order to minimize possible losses resulting from misleading interpretations
of the content of the commitments negotiated.
Such adjustment can take alternative forms, depending on
the kind of relationship that the concerned entrepreneur has
with the others. It is possible to distinguish between the adjustment that rival firms seek to make with respect to their
share in an uncertain future level of aggregate demand, and
the adjustment that firms seek with their customers and suppliers to ensure a minimum level of commitment in response to
such an uncertain aggregate demand. In this respect, firms
may be placed either in a competitive or a complementary
relationship.2 8
First, firms may be put into a competitive relationship.2 9
In this case, consumers regard the commodities they offer as
similar products, or more technically, effective substitutes.
Herein, the profitability of the investments of one entrepreneur

24. See RICHARDSON, supra note 10, at 50.

25. See id. at 32.
26. See id. at 29-48.

27. See id. at 50.
28. See id. at 49-87.
29. See id. at 30-31.
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will be reduced by the investment plans that others implement." Therefore, he will be induced to enter into more or
less formal communication with his competitors, to avoid making mistakes on the amount of resources he devotes to production. Underestimating others' capacity or willingness to invest
may result in excessive future output and waste for all."' At
the same time, entrepreneurs are guided by the opportunities
in sight to attempt to attain the highest possible level of investments in order to maximize profits. Each entrepreneur will
bear an internal tension between following the rule or routine
laid down by all, which would give everyone (including him)
more certainty, and breaking the rule if that should ensure
him a better chance of maximizing profits." Therefore, these
agreements and routines do not ensure that entrepreneurs will
not violate them (or expect others to violate them) should the
particular circumstances dictate it.
Second, firms may be placed in a "vertical" or "complementary" relationship.3 Here, the profitability of one investment
is increased by making another; for example, where the increased availability of one product increases the demand for
another, or where the output of one firm provides an input for
the manufacture of another. Like firms making competitive
investments, those making complementary ones must have
information available in order to be encouraged to invest.' In
other words, the entrepreneur has to determine the minimum
amount of information required, and the different conditions
that would permit access to it.
In this case, investors need to be sure that other entrepreneurs will commit a minimum volume of complementary investment. Here, the entrepreneur willing to satisfy a predicted
demand for the production of widgets by seizing a profit opportunity may require complementary firms to make a minimum
investment for the production of some required inputs. However, firms in one industry may not be prepared to expand with-

30. See RICHARDSON, supra note 10, at 30-31.
31. See id. at 50.
32. See J. KAISLA, MARKET PROCESS AND THE FIRM: SOME INDICATIONS OF
RULE-FOLLOWING AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP UNDER GENUINE UNCERTAINTY (Dep't of
Indus. Econ. and Strategy, Working Paper No. 98-17, 1998).
33. See RICHARDSON, supra note 10, at 31.
34. See id.
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out the assurance that others will follow suit. Even where no
explicit assurance is available, there may be a strong presumption that the necessary investment will take place. In the ongoing process of informational change, entrepreneurs must have
access to the information necessary to adjust production to
market changes successfully, so as to particularize a general
profit opportunity into profit opportunities for each of them.
These conditions rest on the premise that everybody else will
behave as expected.
In addition, firms may be competitors in respect to one
product, and complement each other in respect to another.
Firms that were initially competitors in one market may develop some differentiation, making their respective products
seem less like substitutes in the eyes of consumers, and eventually not as interchangeable.
Both competitive and complementary investments determine the alternatives with which each entrepreneur is faced.
Therefore, their combination encourages the negotiation of
alternative corporate arrangements through which entrepreneurs seek to reduce their uncertainty about future market
conditions, in particular, to ensure the future volume of investments that other firms may make. In the next section we examine how these arrangements come about.
B. An Institutional Theory of the Growth of the Firm
1. The Firm as an Institutional Instrument to Offset Market
Uncertainty
In the context of uncertainty described above, successful
coordination of investment plans to reap profits requires the
existence of certain natural or contrived restraints on freedom
to seize shares in the profit opportunity. 5 Natural restraints
differentiate products and markets, thus making it possible for
some entrepreneurs to seize profit opportunities by displacing
others. They are the result of differing natural conditions imposed on different traders which are the creation of the structural conditions of the market concerned. Natural restraints
comprise, for example, restraints on production such as economies of scale in production. It may not be profitable for a new-

35. See id. at 69-70.
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comer to penetrate an industry if the minimum efficient scale
produces additional output sufficient to cause a large fall in
price, despite its apparent high levels of profits or low efficiency levels. However, rather than viewing them as entry barriers
in the conventional sense of preventing individuals from attaining what is, in any case, an unattainable Pareto ideal, 6
economies of scale are regarded as inevitable limitations on the
production possibilities given the state of current technology.3 7
In addition, there are also restraints limiting the ability of
firms to increase their sales, rather than their output, such as
the "goodwill" or reputation of certain firms enabling the attachment of customers,3 8 which deserve a similar treatment.
Moreover, location or transportation costs may also permit
inefficiency or deliberate supply restriction. Similarly, the legal
protection afforded to trademarks or brand names may create
inevitable difficulties for other firms when placing their competing products in the market. Similarly, albeit to a lesser
extent, product variety may dispense some protection, though
not much, since the nature of consumer demand changes."
Natural restrictions will seldom seriously impede competition.
On the other hand, they do not need to make information
available. Thus, they cannot guarantee to promote efficient
adjustment.
By contrast, contrived restraints are caused by the purposeful action of entrepreneurs that limits the course of action
of the contracting parties, and are relevant for the purposes of
our normative study.4" It is necessary to realize that contrived
arrangements cannot be considered "restrictions of freedom" as
such. Freedom is only obtained when entrepreneurs have alternative courses of action available. In the conventional perspective there is no such freedom. Yet, as this section explains, the
very need for seizing business opportunities requires entrepreneurs to "foreclose" the opportunities of others, and to anticipate them in seizing the opportunity open to them. Otherwise
they would be impeded from obtaining a competitive gain, and
would not be inclined to make investments at all. For this

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

See
See
See
See
See

id. at 42.
id.at 125-126.
id. at 65.
RICHARDSON, supra note 10, at 55-59.
id. at 58.
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reason, it is somewhat misleading to think that contrived restraints somehow impede others' courses of action. An opportunity equally accessible to all is an opportunity lost to everyone.
It is important to examine their relationship with the
creation of informational conditions appropriate to successful
coordination adjustment. Entrepreneurs get the information
necessary to invest on the basis of approximations and "educated guesses" based on the conduct of those they interact with
(competitors and clients) and the kind of productive activity
that they intend to undertake. There are several signals they
look for in order to form reliable expectations about the commitments of firms making complementary and competitive
investments. For example, they may rely upon the expectation
that the status quo of their trading relations will remain unaltered.4 ' They may be persuaded that competitors will not
make a move unless circumstances change;42 or that such
moves, if they should happen, will follow a pattern.4" (For example, seeking to enhance production to retain the same market share). Alternatively, they may rely upon a perspective of
the feasibility of competitors seizing such an opportunity." If
they know that competitors will be unable to seize the opportunity for economic purposes, it will be as if they had never
known. Finally, they may rely upon the level of perceived loyalty of their consumers, or of their competitors.45 To adjust
their offers to future demand, entrepreneurs must protect their
markets from any undercutting by potential competitors. Consumer loyalty is essential in this calculation. For this purpose,
they may develop a differentiated product, based on the reputation or particular attributes of the goods they sell, or on
lower transport costs, or on the location of the goods or services they provide. They may also develop a particular "goodwill"
which differentiates the quality of the service they provide, as
for example, treating loyal customers better, or offering rapid
delivery; servicing facilities; policies of special customer treatment, etc. Another strategy may be to maintain prices irrespec-

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

See
See
See
See
See

id. at 53-54.
id. at 53.
id.
id. at 57.
RICHARDSON, supra note 10, at 65.
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tive of changes in demand. If prices are flexible, it is not possible to ascertain the magnitude of the demand changes for
which producers should plan.46 In connection to this, waiting
lists, advance orders and other similar phenomena arise as a
result of price rigidity, but do not necessarily entail inefficiencies; they may well be indicative of future sales.
At times, however, entrepreneurs may have to enter into a
variety of more formal restraints of differing strengths and
duration, which would restrict their freedom of action. These
arrangements may take two forms. First, entrepreneurs may
endeavor to secure their individual investments by entering
into agreements with their competitors.4 7 These arrangements
may take the form of price alignment, market sharing agreements, or tacit understandings to avoid ruinous competition in
a particular line or product.
Second, producers may increase the security of their individual investments by developing special links with their suppliers or clients.' For example, they may enter into exclusive
dealings to ensure custom for the entire future period. Where
raw materials are involved, it is difficult to develop goodwill or
product differentiation. In these cases, it may be better to
ensure trade by contracting a quantity of the commodity for
sale at a future date and at a fixed price. This is, of course, the
rationale justifying most exclusive dealings and vertical restraints.4 9
Organizations adopt their particular shape as a result of
the conditions that the markets in which entrepreneurs operate impose on them. 0 They do not necessarily stem from the
"intentions" of entrepreneurs to engage in unfair restrictive
trade practices. Rather, the choice of these arrangements depends on the level of information they are supposed to convey,
which is correlative with the perception that each entrepreneur
has of those others (competitors and customers alike) with
whom he deals (trusts) and with the complexity of the productive processes involved in the particular activity. In other
words, organizational choice is constrained by the length of the

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

See
See
See
See
See

id.
id.
id.
id.
id.

at
at
at
at
at

66.
67.
65-66.
66.
74-77.
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relationship (as new circumstances emerge) and complexity of
knowledge (as knowledge of other realities encourages the
revision of initial plans). Information costs in this subjective
sense are therefore essential in shaping the particular organization sought by entrepreneurs. The optimum size of a firm
will be determined not so much by the scales of economy asso-

ciated with any particular operation, but by the number of
complementary operations requiring planned co-ordination.
The length of time required for productive purposes and the
complexity of production are ultimately responsible for the size
and shape of inter-firm co-operation. In the following sections
we examine these questions in more detail.
2. The Organizational Role of Trust in the Market Process
Setting
An effective level of trust between entrepreneurs is essential in encouraging them to make complementary investments.
The intensity of commitment which will reveal how willing
they are to integrate their activities for the common interest,
will depend to a large extent on the length of time that both
parties envisage their relationship to last.
In principle, mutual trust depends on the length of time
within which both parties are certain about the commitment of
the other. As we have indicated above, contractual formality is
contingent on the level of certainty and the length of time that
parties can foresee it lasting at the present time.
In this context, the form of organization chosen by entrepreneurs will depend on the level of opportunity to frame the
conduct of each participant, without losing the flexibility needed to adapt to unforeseen changes. The longer the period envisaged, the more flexible the investment program. But the longer
the contract extends into the future, the more likely it is that
uncertainty is increased due to unforeseen events. This is also
likely to restrain the entrepreneur from modifying his plans to
meet unexpected developments. The point will be reached
where the greater predictability yielded by contracts does not
justify the loss of flexibility involved; for this reason, coordination through market interaction can never be perfect and firms
will inevitably engage in forms of vertical integration." The
51. See RICHARDSON, supra note 10, at 81.
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unavoidable imperfection of economic information will therefore limit the willingness of entrepreneurs to enter into contractual arrangements that could increase the supply of market information.
Entrepreneurs cannot rely on the wording of a contract,
and must therefore rely on an analysis of past behavior, which
involves knowledge that cannot be quantified. The conditions
for supply (quality, quantity, specifications, etc.) cannot be
fully specified, and therefore cannot replace goodwill and reputation. This information cannot be completely expressed
though contractual arrangements.
Thus, where parties are unwilling to accept obligations
with respect to their future behavior, cooperation cannot take
place. In these cases market transactions replace cooperation.
Here, there is no continuing association.
It may be difficult to arrange a prospective return through
long-term contracts in proportion to the risks that parties are
assuming if such risks, relating to class problems, are unknown.52 For example, one party may be required to make
heavy investments in exchange for a return several years
ahead. In this regard, long-term contracts are only one way to
ensure control of the firm responsible for complementary investment. There may be other ways of ensuring compliance
and further control, such as establishing special price conditions. Another solution, when the risks are high (say, due to
faulty contractual enforcement procedures), is to set up a more
intimate form of cooperation than a contract. The two companies might form a subsidiary in which they both possess equity
interest, or might decide to merge.53 With regard to this,
Fukuyama argues that firms may resort to alternative "unofficial" alliances, such as family bonds, to increase the level of
trust that cannot be gained through official channels in "high
trust" societies. 4
For this reason, the longer the relationship is between
investors, the more important the links to eliminate uncertain-

52. See id. at 84.
53. See id. Obviously, under this corporate form, parties still would be related under a contractual bond, but such a link would be more complex in nature,
and regulated under more severe conditions than a simple contract.
54. F. FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF PROSPERITY 23-24 (1995).
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ty are because the parties will have more trouble identifying
possible changes.55
Naturally, an effective level of trust is not determined by a
single factor. Other factors come into play which influence the
level of reliability that entrepreneurs can reasonably expect
from each other. Amongst these factors, the number of alternative suppliers or customers is paramount, as this will give
participants a measure of actual or potential contract alternatives. Entrepreneurs acquire information about other market
participants from several sources. In the first place, they look
at their numbers. If, for example, entrepreneurs have fewer clients, their need for evidence of commitments is likely to be
stronger; therefore, they tend to integrate vertically in these
cases. By contrast, with larger groups, firms tend to rely on the
aggregate supply of complementary investment to influence
their investment decisions. If an entrepreneur fails to make a
deal with one participant, he knows he is likely to find another
participant to deal with. For this reason, the extent of coordination of complementary activities depends on the degree of
development of the country within which they are undertaken.
In a more advanced country, with a large manufacturing sector, the output of one industry is likely to have a large and
varied number of outlets so that there is no need for an acute
complementarity between the investment decisions of any
particular units. 6 In less developed countries, with fewer
firms, any increase in output would have to be absorbed by a
small number of complementary firms.57 Integrity would be
strong, and profitable investment by one producer might depend on the expansion of the others.
3. The Development of Knowledge Capabilities Inside Firms
A second factor determining an entrepreneur's choice in
favor of a given organizational arrangement is the complexity
of productive activities which developed through joint action.5"
Such complexity has to be undertaken by human organizations
embodying appropriate experience and skill. Firms carry out

55.
56.
57.
58.

See
See
See
See

RICHARDSON, supra note 10, at 81.
id. at 85.
id.
Richardson, supra note 5, at 888.
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an extremely large number of activities related to the discovery
and estimation of future wants, research, development and
design, marketing and transformation of physical goods. These
activities require the appropriate knowledge, experience and
skills: command of a particular technology, skill in marketing
or reputation in a particular market. These are essential to
understanding why firms sometimes co-operate and why they
sometimes act as rivals. It is also important in understanding
why they develop new products and make innovative improvements to existing ones.
Firms perform a myriad of productive activities, including
manufacturing, sales and services, consumer support, research
and development, and so forth. All these activities require
"capabilities," which may be undertaken by a single firm or by
several firms linked together with contractual bonds.59 In the
face of uncertainty, firms create "reserves" and develop "capabilities" of skills and knowledge, which enable them to cope
under any unexpected circumstances." Under this perspective, and Adam Smith's ideas on the division of labor,6 ' firms
tend to specialize in the activities for which their capabilities
offer comparative advantage.
The nature of productive activities exploited by entrepreneurs will determine whether certain capabilities held by a
single firm will suffice for this purpose. In other cases, it may
be necessary to contract other firms which possess different
capabilities in order to exploit the activity successfully. Thus,
firms develop around closely complementary capabilities, and
inter-firm outsourcing subsequently results if the activities involved are "dissimilar." Entrepreneurs enter into cooperative
relations to gain access to upstream or downstream activities
because the activities concerned are complementary. Indeed, in
these cases it would not be convenient for a firm to undertake
"dissimilar" activities because that would bring diseconomies of
scope and/or increased informational costs. It is preferable to
develop cooperation through inter-firm arrangements such as

59. See id. The capabilities theory contrasts with the contractual explanation
followed by the neo-classical authors. See generally, N. Fos, CAPABILITIES AND THE
THEORY OF THE FIRM, (Danish Research Unit for Industrial Dynamics, Working
Paper No. 96-8, 1996).
60. See id. at 4.
61. See Hahn, supra note 6, at 8.
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long-term contracts, joint ventures, licensing agreements, and
so on.
Also, capabilities evolve on an ongoing basis, thus changing the landscape of cooperation agreements, firms and markets.
Initially, firms comprise undifferentiated capabilities, but
entrepreneurial discovery eventually leads firms to differentiate product lines.62 "Imagination, rather than information in
any ordinary sense, is what entrepreneurs require in order to
discover new ways of combining resources so as to meet consumers" desires; production functions exist unknown to entrepreneurs only in the sense that musical tunes await discovery;
in either case originality, rather than the possession of "information," as considered exclusively hitherto, is what is required
for successful new combinations to be produced."6 3 Therefore,
the variety of production lines is inextricably linked to the
discovery process that shapes competition: "the scope of entrepreneurial, or competitive activity, is therefore much greater in
reality than in the so-called purely competitive model.""
The activities of firms trading in apparently different activities may be more similar than they appear. At first sight, a
firm may seem to be acquiring another which is engaged in
different activities, but the activity could be interpreted as
similar if the firm is bought to restore efficient management
before reselling.6 5 Management would be the particular capability in this case.
Therefore, firms' capabilities determine the different directions in which companies grow, depending on whether they
(the capabilities) expand and alter.66 However, random factors
also have an influence: in these cases, a firm's motivation for
taking up an activity is not determined by the prior possession
of an appropriate capability, but by cheap acquisition.
New products frequently emerge from the combination of
different capabilities and skills. Inter-firm cooperation enables

62. C. Menger explains how firms initially undertaking activities in a given
sector expand into other sectors by concentraing on what they are better able to
perform. See generally C. Menger, The Principles of Monopoly Trading, in PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS (1981).
63. RICHARDSON, supra note 10, at 105.
64. Id.
65. Richardson, supra note 5, at 889.
66. See id. at 888-889.
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these capabilities to combine and create new products and
services. Hence, complementary activities become the source of
cooperation among firms; the less complementary they are, the
more likely firms are to compete for a bigger share of the undifferentiated "aggregate" demand.67 In this case, price competition will often be the prime element of differentiation between them, but the scope for competition is very limited, as it
will be constrained by price reductions." Assuming that producers choose to make the same commodity with similar production processes, competition between them is possible only
as long as costs are reduced. Such reductions will consist of
minor improvements to the production process. However, if
producers devise new "production functions," combining resources in different ways to make the same or different commodities, the field for active competitive warfare is greatly
enlarged and there is wider scope for innovation.69
Conversely, the process of competition and exploiting comparative advantages may develop particular lines of products
which could turn formerly similar activities into complementary -ones. This process explains why former rivals may find it
desirable to cooperate in developing new products, by mutually
exploiting their respective complementary capabilities. It also
explains why, during their initial stages, markets tend to consist of few firms, each holding a strong position. As time passes, more entrepreneurs become capable of seizing profit opportunities by imitating successful entrepreneurs. Consequently,
markets become less and less concentrated as technologies
spread out amongst producers. Later we examine in detail how
competitive entry undermines the position of those entrepreneurs initially holding a monopoly.
To sum up, firms will tend to develop capabilities dealing
with closely complementary activities themselves, and leave
dissimilar activities to outsourcing. Also, they will leave those
transactions in which they feel that there are sufficient alternative providers for markets, whereas they will attempt to
integrate those areas in which they are required to hold higher
levels of trust, due to the features of the transaction concerned.

67. G.B. Richardson, The Organization of Industry, in FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS
AND CONTRACTS 892 (P. Buckley & J. Michie eds., Oxford University Press 1972).
68. See id. at 893.
69. See id. at 892-3.
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This happens, either because of the need for endurance of the
expectations of transacting parties over time, or due to the
features of the activities in which they engage.
The way entrepreneurs sense their capabilities is ultimately responsible for the decision of outsourcing or developing a
capability within the firm. Hence, this factor will determine
the size and boundaries of the firm. Richardson distinguishes
three modes of coordination of complementary activities."
First, entrepreneurs may seek coordination through "direction,"
where single control fits into a coherent plan and is undertaken by one organization.7 1 Direction within a firm is possible
where economies of scale exist, and where complementary
activities are possible: the larger the organization, the greater
the number of capabilities with which it may to be endowed,
and thus the greater the number of complementary activities
subject to coordination through direction it is likely to undertake.
Second, entrepreneurs may coordinate their activities
through "cooperation," where independent organizations agree
to match their plans in advance.72 Cooperation arises where
there is reason to believe that individual components (i.e. the
interactive parties) of demand are more stable than aggregate
demand considered "as a whole." In this case, the individual
seek to match their investment and output plans
parties would
"ex-ante."73 They have to match "closely complementary" activities, rather than undifferentiated "similar" aggregates.
Coordination is undertaken either through close cooperation,
by institutional arrangements, by limited shareholding, or by
other forms of affiliation. Matching is not only quantitative in
this case, but also qualitative. The personal element is decisive; thus, prices are to some extent irrelevant, in the sense
that their stability does not tell anything in itself about the
value attached by the parties to their underlying relationship.
Finally, the coordination of complementary activities can
be done through market transactions. 4 Here, the benefits
arise indirectly from successive interactive decisions taken in

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

See id. at 890-1.
See id.
See id. at 891.
Richardson, supra note 67, at 891.
See id.
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response to changing profit opportunities. In this case, the
estimates that firms infer from the conduct of other firms are
not based on the individual conduct of particular firms, but on
their actions when considered as a whole. In this case, the
crucial element for reinforcing expectations is not based on the
conduct of the firms concerned, but on their particular features
or pattern of activities, which are diluted in the presumed
aggregate output of all those firms considered to be working
together. Firms will prefer to rely on these market outcomes,
rather than seeking to cooperate with a particular firm. Therefore, coordination through markets occurs whenever there is
reason to believe that aggregate demands are more stable than
their component elements (i.e. the parties involved). Thus,
parties rely on having enough customers to cover the potential
canceling out of random fluctuations in their separate demands.75
These considerations allow a clearer understanding of the
position in which the entrepreneur is placed when deciding in
which arrangement he will engage. Vertically integrated firms
coordinate closely complementary activities, whereas horizontal
alignment should be expected amongst entrepreneurs whose
activities are competitive and where the products and services
offered thus require some degree of homogenization.
The neo-institutional analysis thus espoused inevitably
develops an alternative explanation, which is different from
the market power rationale.76 Therefore, it avoids making entrepreneurs responsible for the lack of competition. One can
conclude that mutual trust and productive complexity fix the
limits of business conduct and organizational structure. Consequently, arguing that entrepreneurs impose these restrictions
on others to achieve some monopolist purpose through market
power seems out of focus. Indeed, the conventional explanation
of market power (that is, the feasibility of imposing a monopolistic price on consumers or of engaging in exclusionary conduct against competitors)7 7 becomes dubious as soon as we
realize how irrelevant it is in the view of competition as a process.

75. See id.
76. See id.
77. RICHARDSON, supra note 10, at 127.
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C. Business Competition in the Market Process Setting: Legal
Barriersas the DeterminingFactorof Market Competitiveness
Under the neo-institutional perspective, what are the causes responsible for restricting competition?
In the market process view, the position held by a firm at
any given point in time does not prevent other firms from
operating freely."8 In other words, it does not give them any
"dominance" or "power" in the market. The suspected monopolist may have the intention of gouging out additional profit due
to his pre-eminent position in the market, but that intention is
only produced by his expectation that the profit opportunity is
there for him to reap.7 9 He may well be wrong. Indeed, the
fact that information about these opportunities is subjective
and the position of our entrepreneur is pervaded by sheer
ignorance affects him too. As Kirzner states, "... . no one
knows, and no one can possibly know, in advance, what 'the'
market price 'ought to be'. . . once it is recognized that no one
does or can know the 'correct' price, it becomes apparent that a
price discriminator is simply 'feeling' his way, by grasping (or
rather, by attempting to grasp) profit opportunities he believes
available to him."" Therefore, the firms' incentives to compete
in the market are not determined by how much market power
incumbent firms exercise either on those firms attempting
entry or on established firms.
Size and pre-eminence in the market are not important
factors as soon as we consider the availability of capital markets to alert entrepreneurs. Of course, the possession and ownership of productive resources gives economic power. But this
power does not become an essential factor in forestalling the
freedom of other entrepreneurs if competitive entry is ensured.
To understand this issue properly, let us examine the nature
and effect of freedom of entry in more detail.
The crucial factor of market competitiveness is competitive
entry, namely, the awareness that institutional rules are sufficiently flexible to give anyone interested a chance to challenge
established industries should the occasion arise.81 Competitive

78. See id.
79. See KAISLA, supra note 32, at 19.
80. Kirzner, The Goals of Antitrust: A Critique, in INFORMACION COMERcIAL
ESPANOLA 18 (1998).
81. F. Machiup, Competition, Pliopoly and Profit, 9 ECONOMICA, No. 33, at 2
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entry will be a sure deterrent to any entrepreneur attempting
to lower the quality or increase the prices of products or services sold.82
Competitive entry ensures that any firm, regardless of
size, or any entrepreneur, regardless of their ownership of
productive factors, will be able to enter into the market, should
incumbent firms decide to raise prices beyond normal levels. It
disciplines those entrepreneurs who attempt to restrict investments in order to maintain a rate of profit which is permanently excessive. In this case, alert entrepreneurs erode the
position of the incumbent firm by exploiting those gaps of information discovered.
Competitive entry requires that no incumbent firm holds
privileges which exploit productive activity. 3 These privileges
arise mainly from government fiat, as well as from private
arrangements bearing similar effects.' For example, laws,
regulations, decrees, and other legal instruments belong to the
first group, whereas arrangements adopted by trade or business associations (e.g., the cartelization of an industry, which
is not to be confused with collusion among competitors) belong
to the second. Indeed, the virtual effect of these private arrangements is virtually to function as a statute would, since
their effects extend over a whole industry.
These privileges prevent entrepreneurs from exercising
their alertness in the discovery of future profit opportunities,
through whatever arrangements they perceive to be necessary
in order to seize these opportunities and co-ordinate the social
system by eliminating gaps of (thus creating new) socially
valuable information. Therefore, competitive entry has little to
do with the prior ownership of resources. Inequality in resource ownership and in the power that such ownership provides is irrelevant to the ongoing process of discovering future
profit opportunities. "It is superior entrepreneurial perceptiveness and prescience alone which is necessary and sufficient for
the grasping of pure profit opportunities."' Even those firms
commanding large volumes of resources must depend on their

(1942).
82.
83.
84.
85.

See
See
See
Id.

id. at 3.
Kirzner, supra note 80, at 18.
id.
at 10-11.
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entrepreneurial foresight to find ways of deploying those resources innovatively. Otherwise these resources will simply
continue to be used conventionally, until shrewder and more
innovative entrepreneurs bid them away from larger but less
entrepreneurial firms.

It soon becomes apparent that market power is non-existent in a changing environment as long as competitive entry
remains unblocked. In this case, the relevant problem is not
how many firms interact within the market, thus enabling
them command of productive resources, but whether those

within it will be threatened by the entry of others, and whether those outside will be allowed to erode the position of incumbents.
Thanks to the flexibility of the institutional framework
market, actors possess freedom to compete.86 Notice that
"competition" in this sense has little connection with, and even
contradicts, neo-classical perfect competition.87 Indeed, the
meaningful question is not whether firms want to eliminate
their capacity to compete, but whether they will be able to do
so indefinitely, thus imposing an absolute and unwanted restriction on freedom. Antitrust policy does not always make
this distinction clear, as it confuses the number of competitors
with their ability to compete." It is clear that in the long run,
absolute restriction on freedom in flexible institutional frameworks is impossible, due to market selection and discipline
imposed over conditions of competitive entry.
In a free market, new entrants will seek to imitate formerly established firms, therefore reducing their profits. For this
reason, a firm can freely expand output without the threat of
excess competitive supply, but will have no protection against
the ultimate encroachment of more innovative rivals and no
opportunity to maintain profits at a permanently abnormal
86. See id.
87. See Machiup, supra note 81, at 3.
88. See id. at 1-2. Machlup explains the sources of this terminological confusion, "The confusion is understandable: where there are many sellers already, why
should there not easily be more sellers when profits lure? In actual practice easy
entry into a trade and large numbers in the trade go well together." However,
.even if a large number of sellers and an augmentable number of sellers seem to
be closely correlated, logically the two things are completely divorced from each
other. And, it will be seen, [they are concepts] of very different nature; indeed,
they belong to different spheres of thought." See also G. STIGLER, MEMOIRS OF AN
UNREGULATED ECONOMIST 92-93 (1988).

2000]

NEO-INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS

275

level. If entry is free, some barriers would persist while others
would disappear as new entrants erode the position of incumbent firms, thus rendering any artificial restrictions useless.
Therefore, under competitive entry, indefinite market foreclosure is impossible.

III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF NEO-INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS FOR
ANTITRUST POLICY IN THE CASE OF EXCLUSIVE DEALINGS

The conventional literature in industrial organization has
often emphasized that market vertical arrangements may lead
to foreclosure and therefore, to welfare inefficiencies. These are
regarded practices oriented to either monopolize the market or
prevent the entry of new competitors. From the conventional
antitrust perspective, vertical integration achieved through
exclusive dealings prima facie appears as an anti-competitive
instrument devised to foreclose market entry to potential competitors.
Salop and Scheffman8 9 consider a set of exclusionary
strategies that while pursuing the same objectives seek to
raise rival's costs instead of cutting prices. One of these strategies is precisely vertical integration."0 While Salop and
Scheffman develop a formal analysis of these issues, here we
will only extract their basic tenets and conclusions.
Let us first consider forward integration into retailing.
According to Salop and Scheffman, "if there are scale economies or other entry barriers in retailing, exclusive dealing
arrangements can raise small rivals' costs of distribution."9 1
Firms may undertake a set of exclusionary strategies that
while pursuing the same objectives seek to raise rivals' costs
instead of cutting prices." One of these strategies is vertical
integration.93

This is basically the same conclusion reached by Aghion
and Bolton as to the negative externalities stemming from
long-term contracts in markets of several buyers. Some kind of
contracts between a seller and a buyer, such as exclusive deal-

89. See S. Salop and D. Scheffman, Raising Rivals' Costs, 73 AM. ECON. REV.
267 (1983).
90. See generally id.
91. Id. at 267.
92. See id.
93. See id.
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ing, deferred rebates by shipping firms, frequent flyer programs, franchise fixed fees, leasing arrangements, etc., serve
the purpose of deterring entry to a market by potential competitors. All these contracts share as a common feature the presence of switching costs or "liquidated damages" that would
make it costlier for a buyer to switch from the incumbent to
the entrant seller.
In both the cases forward integration erects a barrier to
the entry of new competitors and helps to monopolize the market.94 On the other hand, a firm may also raise its rivals'
costs through backward integration into inputs, this being
especially the situation when the upstream unit is a monopolist producer.
In either case these strategies, according to Salop and
Scheffman, yield the same outcome: profitability to the dominant firm, competitor injury and consumer welfare reduction.
In effect, a strategy focused on raising rivals' cost differs from
predatory pricing in that while the latter usually leads to price
cuts, the form generally implies prices increasing with costs.
This is in turn welfare reducing.
Regretfully, the focus of antitrust enforcement has been
misdirected, as excessive emphasis has been placed on market
power attained by incumbent firms in the market, particularly
while the market is in the initial stages of its development.
This is clearly evident in the special focus placed on price considerations as the expression of such "power." Schumpeter
criticized this exaggerated focus of economists on prices as
variables of competition:
As a result of the alternative institutional analysis] the first
thing to go is the traditional conception of the modus operandi of competition. Economists are at long last emerging from
the stage in which price competition was all they saw. As
soon as quality competition and sales effort are admitted into
the sacred precincts of theory, the price variable is ousted
from its dominant position. However, it is still competition
within a rigid pattern of invariant conditions, methods of production and forms of industrial organization in particular,
that practically monopolizes attention. But in capitalist reality as distinguished from its textbook picture, it is not that

94. See P. Aghion and P. Bolton, Contracts as a Barrier to Entry, 77 AM.
ECON. REV. 388 (1987).
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kind of competition which counts but the competition from
the new commodity, the new technology, the new source of
supply, the new type of organization (the largest-scale unit of

control, for instance) competition which commands a decisive
cost or quality advantage and which strikes not at the mar-

gins of the profits and the outputs of the existing firms but at
their foundations and their very lives. This kind of competition is as much more effective than the other as a bombardment is in comparison with forcing a door, and do much more
important than it becomes a matter of comparative indifference whether competition in the ordinary sense functions
more or less promptly; the powerful level that in the long run
expands output and brings down prices is in any case made
of other stuff. 5
In sum, the neo-classical analysis condemns vertical restraints to a permanent policy disapproval by competition
agencies, which can only be overturned through positive evidence of their "efficiencies." In the context of neo-institutional
economics, that cannot certainly be the logical conclusion that
follows.
A. The Neo-Institutional Analysis of Exclusive Dealings and
Vertical Integration
In the light of neo-institutional economics, market organizations are not regarded as potential sources of undue market
foreclosure. Exclusion or limitations of rivalry in a market may
be necessary to ensure that a profit opportunity will be discovered and exploited at all. It may seem ironic (but no less true)
that the more information there is available about these opportunities, the less likely it is that anyone will seize it.
It is necessary to examine more closely how different vertical integration levels acquire a different outlook under a market process perspective.
Klein and Leffler hold that there could be risks of nonperformance where the costs of withdrawing from a transaction
are low to one party and high to the other.9 6 One solution

95. SCHUMIPETER, supra note 18, at 84-85.
96. See B. Klein & K. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615, 625 (1981).
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these authors propose is to increase contractual prices." A
necessary and sufficient condition for performance is the existence of prices sufficiently above salvageable production costs
so that the non-performing firm loses a discounted stream of
rents on future sales which is greater than the wealth increase
from non-performance. Another solution, when determining the
risks involved in the long run proves difficult, is to merge both
firms; in this way compliance is ensured through common
stock and the expectations of the firms involved will not be
diminished."
Klein and Murphy argue that vertical restraints are
means which ensure compliance from dealers when written
contracts are not economically feasible because they would
have to cover every possible contingency. Manufacturers use
vertical restraints to reduce the short-run gain (by limiting
non-performing dealers' ability to expand output) and to increase the long-run gain of performing dealers (by creating a
quasi-rent stream). To induce a desired retailer behaviour
when it is not feasible for a manufacturer to write explicit,
court-enforceable contracts with retailers for the supply of
particular services, the only mechanism is to increase the direct return which retailers receive from consumers when those
services are supplied. Resale Price Maintainance increases this
return by increasing the retail margin, thus creating an incentive for individual retailers to engage in non-price competition
and supply the desired services. Exclusive territories increase
the direct return by eliminating nearby retailers.9 9
The restraints produced by organizational structures appear on the surface to be the very antithesis of the sort of
freedom that drives unsuccessful entrepreneurs out of business; yet it is undeniable that they play an important informational role.
For this reason, the agreements entered into by entrepreneurs can be regarded as efficient in the sense that they ensure them a profit which would otherwise be impossible to
achieve for anyone, and would therefore be lost. Again, a profit

97. See id.
98. See generally Klein & Leffler, supra note 96.
99. See generally B. Klein & K. Murphy, Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement Mechanisms, 31 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1988).
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made available to all is lost by everyone.'00 Without them,
market co-ordination would be impossible, and producers
would certainly be prevented from making new discoveries,
innovation, and related improvements which in the end benefit
consumers. In other words, these advantages would accrue
only if we allow a particular entrepreneur to restrict his freedom of action so as to enable everyone else to have some predictability about his future actions; a condition which, under a
static perspective, appears to be a restriction on rivalry in the
market.
In evolving environments new information constantly
unfolds, thus providing entrepreneurs with new business opportunities. However, these opportunities will not be exploited
unless some restrictive arrangements are devised whereby
some entrepreneurs ensure their chance of seizing such opportunities before other entrepreneurs do. If these opportunities
are equally accessible to all, no one will have an incentive to
get there before everyone else.
From an institutional viewpoint, these arrangements coordinate the integration of scattered knowledge, which would
otherwise remain scattered among many individuals, into socially useful purposes. Therefore in principle, they improve
social welfare and promote competition processes.
Different levels of vertical integration reveal the extent to
which the activities of the firms involved are complementary:
the more complementary, the more integrated. Exclusive contracts can be similar to full vertical integration, where advantages for the coordination of complementary activities are obvious. Exclusive dealings simply require a more reliable business
environment within which to distribute goods or services to
certain customers. Similarly, exclusive supply contracts may
require reliability in supply or resources. Whenever the risks
involved in the activity require it to be so, entrepreneurs can
be inclined to pursue a more stable relationship by acquiring
the management of a firm in an upstream or downstream
market.
In this regard, Richardson classifies organizations on different levels of vertical integration as follows: first, a trading
relationship between two or more parties, which is stable

100. See id.
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enough to make demand expectations more reliable, and thereby facilitates production planning.'' This is the simplest
form of inter-firm cooperation. In this case, the relationship
may acquire its stability through goodwill or more formal arrangements such as long-term contracts or shareholding. The
selection of any of these arrangements is a matter of qualitative rather than quantitative coordination. The habit of working with models that assume a fixed list of goods may be responsible for the neglect of consideration of qualitative coordination and for encouraging us to think merely in terms of the
balancing of quantities of inputs-outputs.' 2
Second, one firm may subcontract another by outsourcing.
This modality is becoming quite popular for co-operation between firms located in different countries. Subcontracting does
not in itself imply much co-operation; and may be the result of
competitive bidding. Stability arises from the fact that subcontractors assume the risks inherent to their narrow
specialiation in skills and equipment; and from the fact that it
permits continued co-operation between those concerned with
the development of specifications, processes and designs.
Third, cooperation between firms relying on each other for
manufacture or marketing. These relationships may entail
complex patterns of coordinated activity, ranging from quantities demanded (promoting quantitative adjustment of supply to
demand), to qualitative standards involving processes or products.
Finally, cooperative arrangements specifically contrived to
pool or transfer technology. These agreements are commonly
based on the licensing or pooling of patents but they provide
_for the provision or exchange of know-how through the transfer
of know-how, personnel, drawings and tools. They are normally
associated
with price agreements, market sharing and the
103
like.
As long as competitive entry to third parties is not
blocked, these will put pressure on integrating firms to be
competitive and avoid "abusive" business behaviour against
consumers.

101. See Richardson, supra note 5, at 884.
102. See id. at 885.
103. See id. at 886.
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B. The Welfare Trade-off Between Short-Term Market Restrictions and Long-Term Innovations
The central question, therefore, lies in determining whether there can be a compromise between the functioning of these
restraints and the conditions of "freedom" which ensiire market discipline and the selection of productively efficient
firms." 4 Public policy has a trade-off to make between the restriction introduced which limits both market discipline and
efficient selection in the short-term, and the information that
the arrangements bring about in the long-term, which will
encourage productive investments. Policy-makers are thus
confronted with the question of whether the endurance of these
restrictions is justified over time, given the economic landscape
of the industry in which they are implemented.
The reasons summarised above justify in principle the creation of organizational structures which restrict short-term
rivalry to enhance long-term discoveries. Thus, appraising the
proper length of these arrangements is crucial. The question,
of course, is can a third party (i.e., a policy-maker, or a competition authority) identify what short-term restrictions should
be challenged and what should be tolerated in order to pursue
long-term, socially-valuable discoveries?
The answer lies in the capacity to choose between the
disadvantages brought about in the short run due to the restrictions imposed on freedom and the welfare brought about
in the long run.
In principle, this is an Herculean task. In the real world,
unless the analyst of a market transaction is simultaneously a
party in it, it is not possible to determine with exactitude what
business activities should be subject to rivalry and what should

104. In the words of Richardson:
There would seem to be a need that the markets of individual producers should be both secure, in order to give them the confidence to
invest, and at the same time vulnerable, lest their policies are inefficient or restrictive. Must we admit this incompatibility to be genuine
and ineluctable? Is it possible to find a compromise between the
conflicting requirements, an optimum degree of inertia or restraint,
which will best favor the process of resource allocation taken as a
whole?
RICHARDSON, supra note 10, at 120.
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be subject to vertical integration." 5 Only entrepreneurs can
have different opinions about the degree to which an economic
activity is complementary or competitive. Thus, they are able
to develop subjective perspectives of market participants, at
times identifying them as competitors, and at times seeing
them as potential customers or suppliers. As the process of
competition is aimed at increasing information and knowledge,
this sometimes leads to rivalry among market participants but
in other cases it leads to cooperation. There is no clear-cut
distinction between competitive and complementary investments. In the end, it is the consumer's subjective perception
based on their preferences, which determines what entrepreneurs will come to regard as complementary and what as competitive. Neo-classical demand theory assumes that consumers
can order their preferences as different combinations from a
fixed list of commodities; the logic of choice. Entrepreneurs,
however, have to determine what combination of qualities
goods must possess; therefore, the model of consumer
behaviour does not suit.' Certain commodities may possess
alternative uses which consumers must decide upon. Preferences between various commodities are not just "given" to a consumer; they have to decide by weighing up the contributions
made by each of them with their own objectives. 7 It is not
preferences between goods, but stability over time which
characterises the various desires that goods meet: some desires
demand changing commodities for their satisfaction (novelty);0 . desires also require social distinction because the possession of a commodity offers prestige when confined to a few
people.' 9 Consumers buy because of the preferences they expect to get. It is a trial-and-error process. In short, consumers
are endowed with a set of desires and form their preferences
for commodities on the basis of their imperfect knowledge of
the power that the commodities have to satisfy these desires.
Entrepreneurs are constantly trying to "guess" the opinions
and tastes of consumers, in order to point their activities in a
105. See id.
106. See P. EARL, MIcROECONOMICS FOR BusINESS AND MARKETING 144-155

(1995).
107. See STIGLER, supra note 88, at 95-96 (citing CHAMBERLAIN, THE THEORY
OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION).

108. See id.
109. See id.
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particular direction.
Therefore, a policy aimed at enhancing competition should
certainly not challenge or undermine these arrangements, but
should confine itself to condemn arrangements that are solely
based on the intention to extract rent from consumers. However, this is not an easy task, as Wiseman observes:
[Tihe fact of uncertainty makes the association of competitive
behaviour and profit maximisation, on which the marketeconomy model depends, less generally acceptable. The desire
to reduce uncertainty by gaining control of the uncertain
variables must be an important motive in attempts to eliminate competition. Uncertainty thus implies the need for positive government policy to ensure competitive behaviour in
pursuit of profit maximisation, since only such behaviour conduces to an efficient distribution of resources. The difficulty
in framing such a policy lies in distinguishing those factors
which are the inevitable accompaniment of ignorance and
uncertainty and those which arise simply out of a desire to
maximise net revenue in an environment characterised by
these things.11 °
This is easy to concede in theory, however, in practice, how
can an external observer such as the competition agency determine whether a decision taken by another subject (i.e., entrepreneur) is the result of either reason?
Only by adopting a long run perspective can one clearly
see that these organizational forms are constantly threatened
by innovation from other firms providing substitute products.
Innovation itself is triggered by the promise of receiving profits
for creativity, which leads to output expansion in the long run.
Clearly, removing all profits would be efficient from an equilibrium point of view, but would threaten innovation and so
would be less efficient in the long run. Innovation has transition costs, and restrictive policies with the old product or technology may ease the transition and spread the costs (retraining, unemployment, etc.) over time. In a long term perspective
innovation will render these arrangements obsolete.

110. J. Wiseman, Uncertainty, Costs and Collectivist Economic Planning, in
L.S.E. ESSAYS ON COST 198, 234 (J. Buchanan & G. Thirlby eds., New York University Press 1973).
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The differences in foresight, or the capacity to increase
production that enable entrepreneurs to gain an advantage
over their competitors are transitory and subjective to the
context within which entrepreneurs adopt their decisions.
Thus, although unlikely, in a given transaction, two contracting parties may well possess different views about the efficiency they expect to get from the arrangement.
Obviously, under a perspective that visualizes markets as
something static, where resources are given and no discovery
arises, all these techniques appear to limit the opportunities
open to entrepreneurs for taking independent paths, and indeed in this sense, they are restrictive. In the process of ensuring customer loyalty, entrepreneurs may attempt several strategies which third parties (i.e. antitrust authorities) could interpret, following a structural logic, as "market foreclosures" imposed against other competitors."' As Lepage contends, "a
number of business conducts traditionally regarded as
'restrictive' and deemed incompatible with the needs of a
healthy competition are nothing else but private contractual
arrangements purporting to improve market functioning (particularly to reinforce the loyalty of the participants in the
transaction) [and competition]."' In a dynamic setting:
[Tihe impact of new things - new technologies for instance on the existing structure of an industry considerably reduces
the long-run scope and importance of practices that aim,
through restricting output, at conserving established positions and at maximizing the profits accruing from them. We
must now recognize the further fact that restrictive practices
of this kind, as far as they are effective, acquire a significance which they would not have in a stationary state or in a
state of slow and balanced growth.'
Hence, it is possible to conclude that in a dynamic evolving
framework, rivalry and co-operation do not really "oppose" each

111. H. LEPAGE, LA NOUVELLE ECONOMIE INDUSTRIELLE 231 (1989) (unofficial
translation). Lepage also adds, "Ce que lEtat considere generalement comme des
entraves ou des atteintes a la concurrence, n'est le plus souvent que le resultat
des procedures utilisees par le marche pour resoudre precisement les problemes
d'efficience et de loyaute qui servent de motif a son intervention." Id. at 233.
112. Id.
113. SCHUMPETER, supra note 18, at 87.
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other, but form a complex game in which managers sometimes
engage in rivalry and sometimes co-operate, according to the
level of differentiation they observe in the activities, products
and services offered by a particular cluster of firms within the
market. Only in a static framework does it appear that both
forms of relationship between firms and markets are contradictory and incompatible. In a dynamic framework, what appears
essential is the competitive entry of any entrepreneur to be
ensured, by eliminating all sources of legal privileges preventing access to the market.
In conclusion, individuals exercise their property rights
and freedom of contract by arranging their affairs and entering
into association with other individuals thus creating a wide
array of corporate structures and business practices set up to
meet their objectives and enhance their mutual business expectations. If not constrained by external interference and legal
privileges, these structures represent the best possible state of
affairs to their members, within the limits of their access to
knowledge and available technology, and their functioning
leads to the efficiency of the spontaneous market order.
It would be difficult, if not impossible, for government
authorities to conclude, on the single basis of the social welfare
trade off analysis between short term contrived market restrictions and long term innovations, whether certain arrangements should be approved. The analysis of competition must
also consider the institutional causations creating pervasive
anti-competitive culture among businessmen. It is necessary to
identify first and foremost, the existence of regulations and
any institutional barriers to the transmission of knowledge
among entrepreneurs. Such competitive entry barriers conflict
with the awareness of entrepreneurs to discover new valuable
business opportunities, or somehow impede this information to
circulate among other entrepreneurs.
C. Selected Examples of the Venezuelan Competition Policy
Experience on the Analysis of Vertical Integration
After having discussed the contrasting neo-classical and
neo-institutional approaches to vertical restrictions as either
efficient and welfare enhancing or exclusionary and welfare
decreasing devices, the original question of this essay remains
unanswered. Throughout the reviewed literature this question
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remains essentially unsettled, mirroring perhaps the strong
disagreement among economists about what purposes vertical
integration serves. Should competition policy challenge these
agreements?
In the beginning, guided by the normative precepts of
conventional antitrust theory, Latin American competition
authorities were inclined to see in vertical restraints an instrument of market foreclosure bearing a monopolistic spin. This is
clearly revealed in the administrative decisions taken by the
Argentinean Competition Commission, Brazil's Cade, the Chilean Fiscalia Economica, Venezuela's Pro-Competencia, and
other agencies in the region.
In the course of time, however, they have realised the need
of acknowledging a more realistic view, grounded on the institutional reality of Latin America, which is predominantly
characterised by the ubiquitous lack of legal certainty and
business unpredictability. It became increasingly obvious that
many restrictive agreements possess beneficial effects which
compensate anti-competitive restrictions, as they normally
combine forms of co-operation between entrepreneurs. In this
sense, they became increasingly aware that the neoclassical
market concentration hypothesis could not explain why competition grew strong in sectors where few economic agents operate.
The development of an extensive rule of reason is seen in
the emphasis that policy enforcement has developed towards
vertical restraints, where the analysis of economic efficiencies
is essential. Compared to the initial emphasis given in the first
stage to horizontal restrictions, and cartel behaviour, the introduction of a more extensive rule of reason analysis highlights
the sophistication gained by competition analysis.
This trend is seen most clearly in the pre-eminence that
efficiency analysis has over competition authorities, persuading
them of developing a more lenient attitude towards restrictions
which were formerly regarded as illegal, under a conventional
structured vision of markets. The new vision, instead, is increasingly emphasizing dynamic elements of market interaction, and the complexities surrounding its functioning. As a result, the legal doctrine has increasingly acknowledged the
beneficial effects of agreements which, notwithstanding the
market power enjoyed by the firms undertaking them, possess
desirable economic effects. As put in an official report of ex-
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perts: "many practices that on the surface appear to be anticompetitive (e.g., vertical market restraints such as exclusive
dealing requirements) can, depending on the circumstances,
serve legitimate pro-competitive purposes.""'
Examples of these undertakings are franchises, exclusive
distributions, exclusive supply arrangements, and licensing.
Generally, most of the jurisdictions reviewed subject these
arrangements to a rule of reason analysis, in which the enforcing agency determines whether the market power of the exercising firm is justified by the economic efficiencies brought
about by the relevant arrangement.
The new analysis emphasizes, besides the traditional elements of antitrust analysis, other aspects of business transactions resulting from the institutional landscape where such
agreements are implemented. Closer attention is given to the
merits of such conduct, as examined in the economic context
where it takes place, rather than relying exclusively on the
market power factor.
The new focus stresses on the need of enhancing the level
of business co-ordination in complex webs of shared knowledge
and industries. Improving co-ordination in the system may
eventually require that potential entrants in the system enjoy a
fair chance of accessing the market, such as a limitation of
their capacity to innovate. Therefore, it is likely that competition agencies will focus on the factors that lessen or impede
such market access. Of course, market access is frequently
subject to numerous impediments arising from both private
and government activities.
One acute problem in this regard has to do with the spontaneous arrangements arrived by competitors in a given industry to standardise their products. The standardisation of the
web production may impose unexpected or unnecessary costs to
potential entrants; yet it may also be necessary to enhance
scope economies, develop shared capabilities, and deliver consumers the minimum quality they expect from the products
they purchase from the market. However, the compulsory imposition of such standards, either under joint trade association
decisions or by government fiat, may lessen the fair opportuni-

114. Competition Policy and Economic Reform: An Interpretative Summary, The
World Bank, (OECD, CADE, IBRAC eds. 1998) pp. 18-19.
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ty of potential entrants to access the market. It may be necessary to intervene through antitrust enforcement in these occasions, albeit with care, and distinguish the necessary
standardisation from the unnecessary one.
In vertical relationships, the problems of accessing networks may be more crucial if the network is essential to the
trade of downstream firms. Here the policy dilemma is more
evident, because the gains of allowing an unlimited number of
entrants may discourage incumbent firms to make further
investments in the improvement of the network (to preserve
monopoly gains from limiting access to everyone else) and
therefore, hamper the standards of quality necessary to preserve the very existence of the web. On the other hand, the
disproportionate foreclosure of the network may impair its
future value, because it may limit the access of clients excessively and, as a result, of profits that could be otherwise reinvested in improving the network. Access to the network is
crucial to ensure that the network itself develops and gains
more value. These problems are evident in the case of infrastructure industries, such as telecommunications, water supply, electricity, and similar others. In these industries, the
impediments placed on potential entrants by incumbent firms
at the point of entry not only undermine the rights of the former to a fair chance of competing in the market, but also lessen the value of the infrastructure as a whole, by limiting the
number of potential competitors in it, thus, reducing the exchange of ideas and innovations.
In this section we explain the implications of the new perspective in the antitrust analysis carried out by Venezuela's
competition authority, the Superintendencia para la Promocion
y Proteccion de la Libre Competencia (Pro-Competencia).
In the TV Cable case, decided by Pro-Competencia in
1999,11' several TV cable companies sued several operating
electricity companies for not allowing them to install their
connecting wires at the poles belonging to the former. Allegedly, the electricity companies had the intention of imposing
exploitative contractual conditions, which also excluded them
from the market. The contracts did establish a rental price

115. Resolution N0 SPPLC/034-99.
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which was not considered to be monopolistic itself; yet, the lack
of a contractual formula for the rental price increases was
regarded to be against the legitimate expectations of the parties concerned, as enforcing such price increases was in some
instances much higher than inflation levels. The inflation rate
is the formula conventionally applied in rent contracts in the
absence of an express formula determining how price increases
will take place. Here, Pro-Competenciaconsidered the development of a future market such as TV cable, for which network
access was essential, and therefore had to be protected.
Furthering potential market network co-ordination is an
activity requiring from the enforcing agency an exercise of
forecast, and as such, its success is much dependent of the
level of free will left to economic agents to behave in such a
way that their individual actions promote the development of
the network as a whole. By no means does it entail the dictation, by the competition agency, of a given or predefined course
of action, as this would surely reach the opposite results: network stagnation, the reluctance of agents to invest in higher
network co-ordination, and their long-term impoverishment. A
practical way of ensuring the former and avoiding the latter is
by concentrating the policy focus on eliminating sources of
institutional uncertainty from the economic system.
Pro-Competencia is paying increasing attention to the
factors that characterise the activity of firms in the market in
an uncertain institutional environment. The reappraisal is
focused on the arrangements entered into by firms for preventing or limiting uncertainty in their dealings with other firms.
As a result, Pro-Competencia has developed the "doctrine of
legitimate expectations," whereby the analysis of restrictive
behaviour not only focuses on whether short term efficiency
considerations offset exploitative or excluding conditions imposed in market transactions, but also on whether businesses'
legitimate expectations, in the long run, are preserved. This
doctrine is currently (but not exclusively, as stated in the TV
cable case indicated above)11 6 applied in cases involving unfair competition (e.g., false advertising, simulation of products,
violation of industrial secrets), where the precise definition of
what constitutes fair and unfair had always been related to

116. See id.
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the certainty in their trade activities that businesses get from
moral codes of behaviour. The legitimate expectations doctrine
represents a step further, as it attempts to give the competition agency an upper hand with which to appraise the potential prospective consequences of market interaction, should the
expectations of individuals entering into market transactions
be protected.
The new economy has also impacted the way in which
competition agencies are increasingly undertaking market
analysis, by introducing new analytical tools that concentrate
not so much on past market concentration as on what the prospective development of the market might be. Therefore, introducing a measurement of market behaviour in the course of
time becomes crucial in the analysis of competition and in the
assessment of the anti-competitive nature of restrictions foreclosing the market. The time factor reveals an important and
novel trend emerging in the analysis of market size. Businesses that appear to compete in the short run may not compete in
the long run, and thus be regarded as outside the relevant
market for the period reviewed. Similarly, businesses that
operate in one market may foreclosure downstream developing
markets, particularly if they are in control of a resource essential for ensuring such development.
Market size analysis is not limited to structural short-term
considerations. Often, if not always, it depends on the subjective perceptions of those engaged in the transactions themselves. For example, income levels affect the range of preferences of consumers for a given period, and, therefore, their
willingness to substitute one product for another. Assuming
that substitutability will remain stable for long-term periods is
an unwarranted assumption.
Today, Pro-Competencia emphasises the institutional conditions within which markets function, and is less concerned
with concentration levels. Therefore, it pays more attention to
incorporating dynamic elements in market analysis, and to
entry barriers, particularly those of legal origin. Thus, since
1998, there has been a marked concern for incorporating a
fuller consideration of the elements that characterize market
size in a long run perspective. For instance, attention is paid to
innovation as a factor of antitrust analysis. In the Venezuelan
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AGB case," several TV channels claimed that the most important rating company, AGB, had been manipulating rating
levels in favour of other TV companies. In defining the potential effects of the alleged behaviour, Pro-Competencia took the
view that AGB's activity, in fact, provided a useful service, by
encouraging innovation, and a better use of social resources,
from a long-run perspective. Conventionally, TV companies
define a year in advance the spaces available for advertising.
However, this mechanism may prove too rigid for smaller advertising companies, whose need for segmenting available TV
spaces is not satisfied under that scheme. AGB's activity could
enable more information about the exact value of TV spaces all
year round, hence, encouraging smaller TV companies to offer
better conditions for trading the advertising "spaces" with
advertising agencies, and making a better use of TV space, as
a "social resource." Thus, such information would enable the
growth of new markets for placing different products, and for
enabling smaller advertising agencies to negotiate TV space for
their products.
Another case that reveals how economic efficiency considerations justify the vertical integration of a firm that enjoys a
dominant position in the market is found in the Toyota
case."' Here, Pro-Competencia found that the exclusion of
non-authorized dealers was legitimate, because of the efficiencies expected to report to the development of markets. Toyota
decided, in 1997, to change its traditional policy of selling replacement parts to independent distributors, in order to develop a policy called "just in time." According to the new policy,
Toyota refrained from selling replacement parts to
unauthorised sellers, thus raising the profits of Toyota's exclusive agents. In return, Toyota could get a better assessment of
the timing schedules necessary for the replacement of used
parts within the industry, as exclusive distributors had a closer relationship to Toyota, and the latter could have a better
knowledge of their commercial needs for replacement parts,
compared to isolated independent distributors. In this way
Toyota could make better plans for sensibly reducing its stocks
and inventories, all of which would reduce consumer prices in

117. Resolution N0 SPPLC/0004-99.
118. Resolution SPPLC No. 0015-98.
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the long run. Pro-Competencia regarded this explanation as a
reasonable justification based on economic efficiency considerations.
In conclusion, the Venezuelan competition analysis of
vertical restraints shows a clear analytical concern for the
efficiencies brought about by certain restrictive conducts. The
fact that more complex and sophisticated forms of market
restriction have superseded "simpler" competition infringements reveals the development of competition enforcement in
the region. All this is leading the authorities to reinterpret the
notion of economic efficiencies, following a broader view of the
market, and of the problems affecting its transparent functioning. In part, this is a consequence of the interest of competition
authorities in considering other elements different from those
embodied in the conventional analysis of economic theory. In
particular, the new focus is revealing a concern for linking
competition policy to issues of economic development. In essence, the new approach concentrates its attention to the emergence of long-term innovations, which can arise from shortterm restrictions to competition. This assessment regards the
long-term benefits that certain restrictions could bring about in
the efficient development of innovations. Therefore, it is a perspective that emphasises the role played by institutions spontaneously emerged in limiting the uncertainty of the business
environment, which is necessary for inducing them to innovate,
and indeed, to compete. The approach, which is being increasingly known as the "New Economy," is particularly relevant to
assess the situation of developing countries, engaged in institutional transition. 9
Probably, this emphasis will show the way for other Latin
American agencies to follow. After all, economic development is
about the long-term. Societies structure their institutions,
routines, and social networking to promote economic growth.
The New Economy provides a proper analytical tool to examine
the emergence of routines and of institutions that shape market transactions. This analysis focuses on the emergence of
standards and networks defining the ongoing process of evolution that takes place within markets, determining the emergence of firms, products, and new technologies. Therefore, it

119. K. KELLY, NEW RULES FOR THE NEW ECONOMY, (1999).
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gives the focus point from which it is possible to derive a theory of market competition in the transitional and changing
landscape of Latin American institutions.
Competition agencies in the region may not have articulated these principles in a systematic way, as yet, but it is undeniable that they are increasingly being influenced by this novel
approach; as it is revealed in their enforcement activities.
Clearly, they are steadily developing awareness of their selfidentity, and of their role in the promotion of social welfare.
This self-identity is reinforced by the recognition that the promotion of policy initiatives for the promotion of competition in
developing countries requires due consideration of special caveats. These guidelines have been aptly summarized as follows:
1. Emphasis on dynamic rather than static efficiency as the
main objective of competition policy in developing countries.
2. Introduction of a concept of 'optimal degree of competition'
(rather than that of maximum competition) to promote long
term growth of productivity;
3. Introduction of a related concept of 'optimal combination of
competition and co-operation' between firms so that developing countries can achieve rapid long-term economic growth.
4. The critical need of maintaining the private sector's propensity to invest at high levels requires a steady growth of
profits; for this to occur there is a need for government coordination of investment decisions which in turn requires
close co-operation between government and business;
5. Introduction of the concept of 'simulated competition',
which involves contests among those seeking state support
and which can be as powerful as real market competition;
6. The recognition of the importance for developing countries
of industrial policy and hence the need for coherence between
industrial and competition policies.12 °

120. The South Centre, CompetitionPolicy, Development and Developing Countries,
at 7, Trade-Related Agenda, Development and Equity (TRADE) Working Papers,
November 1999.
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These principles are changing the perception of competition
policy as one aimed at improving the co-ordination feasible in a
given industry and not one dealing with attaining optimal
social resource allocation. This is hardly surprising, given the
structural nature of the problems faced by markets in the
region. It is difficult to think that competition agencies can
overcome the magnitude of the structural malfunctioning by
appealing to antitrust remedies alone, without influencing or
challenging the rules of the game where economic agents develop their relationships.
By applying these ideas in their practical policy enforcement, competition agencies in the region are paying increasing
attention to new areas of policy enforcement, which had been
neglected in favour of the conventional analysis of market
concentration.
IV. CERTAIN GUIDELINES TO FOLLOW IN THE PROMOTION OF
COMPETITION

The concepts indicated above establish an idea of the kind
of government intervention compatible with the promotion of
markets and of competition.
In the neo-institutional approach, public interest is not
embodied in an abstract formula of social welfare devised in
the mind of a superior "central planner" under an abstract
welfare calculation of efficiency (as for example, the Pareto
Criterion, or the Kaldor-Hicks). Instead, it integrates with a
truly social sense the mutual perceptions and collective wants
of many individuals through an aggregate "opinion" expressing
the particular way that individuals find most acceptable for coordinating their activities.
Under the institutional paradigm, the social efficiency
standard does not measure how resources are allocated but
how much the social system co-ordinates scattered, changing
information, which is subjectively perceived by different entrepreneurs according to their own learning experiences.12 '
The allocation of resources is essentially a problem involv-

121. The emphasis on the coordination of plans, rather than on the allocation
of resources, as a measure of social efficiency was first made by F.A. Hayek. See
F.A. Hayek, Economics and Knowledge, IV ECONOMICA 33 (1937). N. Foss, Austrian and Post-MarshallianEconomics: The Bridging Work of George Richardson,
in ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION, CAPABILITIES AND CO-ORDINATION 145 (1998).
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ing the decision of each individual in the social system, whereas co-ordination is the key to understanding how different
plans and pieces of knowledge are separately held in the mesh
of a social setting. Economic theory has not as yet clearly acknowledged the full implications of this different perspective,
being concerned almost exclusively with the individual level. In
Hayek's words:
The economic problem of society is thus not merely a problem
of how to allocate "given" resources, if "given" is taken to
mean 'given' to a single mind which deliberately solves the
problem set by these data. It is rather a problem of how to
secure the best use of resources known to any of the members
of society, for ends whose relative importance only these
individuals know. Or, to put it briefly, it is a problem of the
utilization
of knowledge which is not given to anyone in its
22
totality.

Social efficiency is only feasible if entrepreneurs can coordinate their activities to the maximum and exchange available
information which enables them to meet their goals.
Markets possess an inner condition of pattern coordination
or institutional efficiency which brings about a correspondence
between the expectations of each participant through a learning process. This way of coordinating individual actions secures
an effective utilization of the knowledge and skills of the members. Later, we will explore how market arrangements provide
the necessary web of information to reach a solution to this
problem of uncertainty.
In this perspective, the existence of externalities lessening
"public interest" in the conventional Pigouvian sense is, by
definition, denied." In the context of market relationships,
122. F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519-520
(1940).
123. De Soto, La Methodenstreit, o el Enfoque Austriaco Frente al Enfoque
Neoclasico en la Ciencia Economica, ACTAS DEL 5. CONGRESO DE ECONOMIA REGIONAL DE CASTILLA Y LEON 58 (Nov. 28-30, 1996). This trial and error process
inevitably disappoints some expectations. Responses to the differences between the
expected and the actual results will lead to fewer frustrated expectations in the
next round. Hence, there will be some expectations that the market order will
inevitably fail to fulfil. See F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE ch. 10 (1973). Nevertheless, the process has created new
knowledge, although in a negative sense, but indicating what course of action
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as Huerta de Soto explains, the fact that entrepreneurs fail to
see or ignore the existence of profit opportunities leads them to
err."2 But with this approach, such errors do not necessarily
entail a negative bias, as the notion of market failures would,
because their existence provides an opportunity to profit for
more alert entrepreneurs, "It is precisely the existence of
[sheer entrepreneurial errors] that generates pure entrepreneurial profit."" Therefore, the presence of errors does not
diminish the efficiency of the open-ended system, as long as
individuals are left free to correct them.
Hence, public interest is not related to the protection of a
value which lies "outside" the will of those actually involved in
the transaction concerned. It is more related to the generation
of valuable information, achieved through a learning process
which demands both coordination between entrepreneurs and
competition so that they may seize information gaps and reveal
uncoordinated business opportunities. Its existence does not
depend on the specific outcomes achieved at one given stage. In
this framework, there are neither "good" nor "bad" market
outcomes resulting from the interaction of entrepreneurs, simply because there is no aggregate welfare standard against
which reality can be meaningfully compared and contrasted.
There is no way in which governments can acquire sufficient
information to decide the "right" size or composition of markets. As Foss argues, "it is not possible to discriminate among
different kinds of economic organization on grounds of efficiency under full information and no uncertainty; one kind of economic organization is as good (efficient) as any other kind."26
If so, it seems at first instance that the role of governments is
significantly reduced.
Yet such a conclusion does not necessarily follow. On the
contrary, governments in the neo-institutional approach have
an important role to play in facilitating the discovery of institutionally-efficient arrangements that could ease the coordina-

should be avoided. In this way, markets fulfill a social role in disclosing hidden
information, even if by doing so some individual expectations have to be disappointed. Market order guides individuals' actions and brings about a correspondence between the expectations of the people that actually succeed, while inducing
unsuccessful ones to sharpen their forecasts in future transactions.
124. See Soto, supra note 116, at 58.
125. Id.
126. FOSS, supra note 8, at 6.
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tion of investments. It may be important to recall that under
the neo-institutional perspective, individuals are not regarded
automatons (i.e., homo economicus) possessing full information
of their choice alternatives. 127 In the real world entrepreneurs
decide to invest depending on the context where they operate,
as they interpret the latter. Entrepreneurs realize that certain
environments are more conducive than others to enhance the
likelihood of a safe return for their investments. Certain institutional environments reduce business uncertainty and enhance the predictability of the expectations of everyone in the
system, compared to others. They identify such environments
following a learning process, based on the analysis of past
experience, which may tell them that certain institutions are
preferable to others for the sake of enhancing cooperation.
Also, they may realize, after comparing the experience of other
societies in the implementation of social institutions, that alternative institutions may be preferable to their own.
Thus, public interest depends on the fact that present and
prospective coordination is improved as much as possible, because it is then that the hidden value of social information will
materialize and satisfy the needs of those who "become aware
of it." Governments could play an important role in encouraging such improvements in market coordination.
Hayek gives us a hint:
Policy need not be guided by the striving for the achievement
of particular results, but may be directed towards securing an
abstract overall order of such character that it will secure for
the members the best chance of achieving their different and
largely unknown particular ends. The aim of policy in such a
society would have to be to increase equally the chances for
any unknown member of society of pursuing with success his
equally unknown purposes, and to restrict the use of coercion... to the enforcement of such rules as will, if universally applied, tend in this sense to improve everyone's opportunities."
This institutional perspective defines a two tier level of
rules, which emerge at different speeds: first, there is a level of

127. See discussion, infra Part IV.
128. Hayek, supra note 121, at 114.
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social rules which provide a stable shelter of predictability
within which entrepreneurs may adapt their particular businesses 129 and second, there is a level of rules that emerges
from the commercial routines and practices of immediate market interaction. 3 ' The responsibility for keeping the first level updated and adaptable to market needs is essentially (albeit
not exclusively) in the hands of governments, whereas the
second is essentially defined by entrepreneurs in their dealings.'"' Changing circumstances make the second level bound
to experience more frequent changes, as entrepreneurs develop
and adjust the boundaries of their relations with other entrepreneurs, both at a competitive and complementary level. By
contrast, the level of general rules tends to evolve at a slower
pace, since its materialization depends on the cumulative social learning process brought about by: failures and successes of
particular experiences.
This is not to say that general rules can eventually achieve
an "optimal" point of efficiency in this task. However, preserving an environment governed by "general rules" is important,
since such rules embody accumulative knowledge that enables
the authorities to decide, without being constrained by their
own imperfect knowledge about a particular situation, simply
because the specifics are circumvented in the decision making
process. As Rizzo predicates:
The need for rules is predicated on our ignorance ....Rules
must therefore be applied in particular cases regardless of
the hypothesized or "guessed-at" consequences. The very unpredictability of these consequences requires adherence to the
given rule ...If the law cannot systematically achieve specific social goals, then the best it can do is provide a stable
order in which individuals are free to pursue their own goals.
The unpredictability of a rule's effect in a concrete situation
is the price we must pay so as to achieve the predictability of
the abstract order.'32
Preserving a set of general rules does not necessarily sub129. See id.
130. See id.
131. See id.

132. Rizzo, Rules Versus Cost-Benefit Analysis in the Common Law, 4 THE
CATO J. 873 (1985).
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ject the whole system to stagnation. The cumulative learning
process embodied in emerging general rules never ends, due to
the very essence of the discovery process. They provide a stable
shelter of predictability within which entrepreneurs may adapt
their particular businesses, but which acts as a shelter in constant flux as well.
Furthermore, identifying a set of general rules is an entirely different task compared to deciding whether market arrangements are optimal. This is a decision that only those
engaged in the transaction concerned can meaningfully take.
Only entrepreneurs can decide which organizational structures
they should choose to meet their needs, even they do not know
for sure what activities they need in order to integrate with
other individuals, or for how long. Managers are neither omniscient decision-makers, nor immune to mistakes; they are
subject to the natural limitations of human knowledge. However, it is still easy to see that entrepreneurs are better suited to
appraise the particular circumstances involved in any given
transaction. The closer individuals are connected to the situation whose uncertainty they wish to control, the more likely
they are to succeed. 3
Evidently, this is a question which depends upon the subjective perception of the individuals concerned. The closer individuals are to the situation at hand, the more they will know
about it, and the less "open" the rules will therefore presumably be. On the other hand, if individuals are distant, they will
obviously have to leave their commitments more "open" to
incorporate any new knowledge, which is unavailable at that
particular time.
Consequently, if the goal is to enhance the level of efficiency of markets, measured in terms of new discoveries of valuable information (i.e. innovation, technological progress, etc),
then the legal system must be supportive of individual decisions to develop particular "rules," "patterns" or "institutions,",
"corporate forms" or "levels of contractual integration," which

133. As Hayek contends, "If we can agree that the economic problem of society is mainly one of adaptation to changes in the particular circumstances of time
and place, it would seem to follow that the ultimate decisions must be left to the
people who are familiar with these circumstances, who know directly of the relevant changes and of the resources immediately available to meet them." See
Hayek, supra note 121, at 525.
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enable the process to unfold as much information as entrepreneurs are capable of discovering."'
Governments should therefore acknowledge their own
limitations by enabling individuals to negotiate freely the institutional arrangements which they believe will reduce their
uncertainty. In this way they can do a great deal for improving
institutional conditions which introduce unnecessary curtailments of social knowledge, thus enabling firms to be spared
from these.
What are the implications of this perspective for the design of competition policy?
Setting up the right framework to stimulate free competition requires fulfilling two essential conditions, which governments could ensure. First, policymakers should eliminate institutional obstacles impeding entrepreneurs to coordinate their
scattered bits of knowledge with the rest. These obstacles could
arise from regulations imposed at the request of interest
groups pressing against liberalization of the economy who
exercise rentseeking activities. Also, they could arise from the
erosion of the legitimate expectations of those engaged in trade
activities, due to the misbehavior of other firms.
Public policy, then, should define those instances where
entrepreneurs are prevented from voluntarily defining the
limits of market organisation. This could happen, for instance,
if a gap in the legal protection of these rights or defective official enforcement encourages other entrepreneurs to misappropriate business reputation (i.e., violation of copyrights or trademarks). More significantly, government regulations could distort the growth of economic organization by dictating entrepreneurs how to behave in the market. Public policy which aims
to preserve competition should focus on either challenging
market restraints, which are sustained by a legal source or
challenging the legal source itself.
Also, they could emerge as a result of the poor awareness
of entrepreneurs concerning business opportunities, thereby
being lost. Obviously, enhancing through education the likelihood of these opportunities should be a policy priority in the
industrial policy of any government.

134. See id.
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In sum, the following guidelines are recommended:
1. In the area of vertical agreements and exclusive dealings, competition authorities should be more sensitive to the
cultural setting where the allegedly anti-competitive agreements are undertaken. This setting is comprised by patterns
and routines developed by businesses, which determine the
size of the firm. A proper understanding of the underlying
reasons supporting these patterns is beyond economic analysis.
Determining whether a given business behaviour is
procompetitive or anticompetitive is not only a matter that
economic welfare analysis can sort out. Competition agencies
above all should evaluate the importance of the conducts reviewed in the context of the cultural setting where they take
place. Some conducts that appear to outsiders as restrictive
may not be so if we use a different approach from the conventional neoclassical one. Under this alternative perspective,
these arrangements are neither restrictive nor anticompetitive,
but simply fulfil a role, which may be socially useful or harmful, depending on the goals sought by the community.
2. As a consequence of the former, the rule of reason analysis should not only ascertain the short term welfare loss of
the undertakings analysed but also the long term welfare benefits that they could bring about in terms of new discoveries,
innovations, the exploitation of new markets. These agreements are often nothing but institutional devices emerged over
time to cope with the institutional uncertainty characterising
Latin American domestic markets. Others are instruments to
offset government interventionism in specific areas. Therefore,
no general simplistic conclusions can be drawn in advance.
3. The former also calls for the revision of the enforcement
criteria, to enable the suspected firm to challenge the presumption against her on the basis of the efficiencies that could always arise as a result of a conduct. No per se behaviour should
be enforced against any conduct, as the analysis of the environment where such behaviour takes place will always be necessary.
4. In the area of dominance and unilateral behaviour, network access to small firms is also a priority. Very often this
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access is limited by legal impediments making the access obtrusive or difficult. Obviously, the higher the costs of accessing
to an essential network, the less likely it will be for smaller
firms to compete. This is the case of sectors representing a
vital network infrastructure for firms competing downstream.
Public policy should guarantee access to competing or downstre an firms requiring access to an essential facility, or to an
array of essential business services and other inputs in the
case of downstream user enterprises.
V. CONCLUSIONS.
Markets are organizations that emerge spontaneously as
an integrated network of rules devised by their participants,
whose existence is justified by the need to find solutions to the
new and recurrent problems created by ever-changing information. Such changes in the subjective perceptions of entrepreneurs enable them to see knowledge gaps unseen by other
entrepreneurs, and to therefore forecast profit opportunities,
which they attempt to seize before the others. These gaps encourage them to compete as long as they feel they can outdo
their rivals, provided they are sufficiently alert. Whenever an
alert entrepreneur discovers an information gap, thus identifying a profit opportunity, profits may not materialise (in which
case, it is as if no discovery has been made) unless our single
entrepreneur seeks cooperation with others. Finally, these gaps
can sometimes be seized and exploited only if firms give out
alternative choices to those with whom they must trade in
order to make the opportunities real.
For these reasons, condemning organizational structures
embodied in business strategies because they restrict rivalry in
the market could be a misjudgment of their economic rationale.
This could also lead governments to impose losses on society,
because it could induce them to prevent (or make costlier) the
exploitation of valuable information, and distort future processes of information discovery.
As a result, one should not draw hurried conclusions from
the varied arrangements which comprise markets without
understanding the context of evolutionary and changing information within which they are placed. By assuming perfect
information, the conventional paradigm assumes away the
main problem faced by entrepreneurs, which is their decision
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to integrate and cooperate with many "restrictive" forms in
order to insure them against the factor of sheer uncertainty.
By adopting an evolutionary institutional perspective, these
arrangements appear as the outcome of differing and unavoidable levels of knowledge handled by different entrepreneurs.
The need to develop regulations which fit the needs of
entrepreneurial discovery is all the more important if one considers the need to ensure effective compliance with them by
those who are subject to them. This is particularly relevant in
the case of those countries possessing weakened official institutions that are incapable of effectively ensuring compliance with
the rules laid down by the policy makers.
Forcing the entry (or endurance) of more firms into an
industry than it can naturally tolerate with the aid of regulatory devices would do away with the freedom of those affected by
the prohibition placed on their actions (to buy and sell, set
whatever prices they regard as convenient, insure their businesses from unexpected risks, and so on) and would not compensate those firms which have suffered any loss of freedom.
Indeed, these would have no more freedom to decide any given
course of action. Any decision would now depend, not on their
own will, but on the existence of the regulation imposed.
For this reason, Salin believes that the use of the term
"restriction" for such barriers or impediments to competition is
misleading, because it compares them with a nonrestrictive
standard, which in this case is impossible.'3 5 In an imaginary
world this standard would be the existence of perfect information among producers, which would allow them to avoid inconvenient restrictions on their freedom, otherwise necessary to
overcome any problems in obtaining information concerning
future demand.13 6 Thus, when the time factor is considered,
present contractual (or formal) constraints over future action
cannot be seen as restrictions on competition or on freedom,
but as means of ensuring expectations and ensuring access to
valuable information on profit opportunities.
For this reason, these seeming 'limitations on freedom"
which enable some firms to seize profit opportunities, cannot

135. P. Salin, Cartels as Efficient Productive Structures, REV. OF AUS. ECON.
at 29, 34 (1996).
136. See id.
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last indefinitely in a voluntarily negotiated setting. In such an
evolving setting, the restrictive effects of these arrangements
are irrelevant because they create the conditions favourable for
their own elimination. As time passes, new circumstances
render these agreements obsolete. This erodes their use as
conveyors of useful information on how to meet consumer demand (and therefore, how to make some profit). Knowledge
gaps resulting from the obsolescence of former conventions
solutions will encourage alert entrepreneurs to make new ones,
and thus seize the new profit opportunities created.
Different organizational forms enable information to reach
some market participants, at the expense of restricting the
freedom of the participants, but at the same time, enhancing
their possibilities for them to receive such profits from others.
Therefore, it will encourage them to make further investments.
In the words of Richardson, "these market connections, whatever the additional objectives for which they are designed, and
whatever their indirect effects, do afford entrepreneurs a more
secure market for their individual products. They serve, in
other words, as a means of increasing the amount of market
information in a decentralised economy, or, in other words, of
increasing the predictability of the entrepreneurial environment."i" 7 Thus, "the availability of [the] kind of such information - that related to competitive production - depends in particular on the existence of restraints which, in varying degree,
reduce the freedom of action of individual entrepreneurs." 3 '
Ignoring or neglecting official regulations is entrenched in
the culture of Latin American effective institutions. It is therefore essential that policy-makers do not attempt to curb market functioning on the basis of aiming to achieve outcomes
which, as we have seen, are not even subject to commonly
agreed standards. It is not only a question that policymakers
will be incapable of defining social welfare goals accepted by
all, or even that they will be misled by their closedend perspective of market interaction. Optimal regulation will never be so
if it cannot achieve its aims due to the resistance of those subject to it. This is, again, all the more important in Latin America, because of the cultural values impinging upon the enforce-

137. RICHARDSON, supra note 10, at 68-69.
138. Id. at 69.
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ability of official rules.'39
If competition is designing incentives to put firms under
the constant threat of being driven out of the market if they
fail to discover or exploit useful information, competition policy
should ensure that firms are not prevented from making their
own discoveries and exploiting opportunities whenever they
have the possibility of doing so.
In the real world there is no such division between firms
and markets. Instead, there is a continuum passing from
transactions, such as those organized in the commodity market
where co-operation is negligible, through intermediate areas
where there are linkages based on goodwill, to complex and
interlocking clusters, groups and alliances, which represent
fully developed co-operation.
Individuals interact in the market through complex corporate forms, which co-ordinate their activities to achieve their
production goals. Freedom of contract enables them to arrange
their affairs as they see fit, giving rise to firms of varying
shapes and sizes. Contractual freedom enables individuals to
create whatever corporate form they consider necessary to
achieve "institutional efficiency," i.e., they can reach their
individual goals through a mixture of rivalry and cooperation.
This provides them with the best information they can possibly
have to arrange their affairs.
Conventional antitrust analysis suffers from an intrinsic
inability to understand the nature of firms. Thus, it condemns
several forms of market arrangements to being branded as
"anti-competitive restrictions" which deserve surveillance.
However, under an alternative neo-institutional approach
which emphasises on how markets evolve, and how entrepreneurs seek ways to eliminate their uncertainty about the fate
of their investments, certain "restrictive" contractual and corporate arrangements institutionally emerged, may prove necessary to encourage them to invest.

139. On this question, Voigt emphasizes the significance of "preconstitutional"
values in ensuring the effective credibility of constitutional rules. He claims that
this is a factor absent from the Latin American reality, thus leading these countries to disregard the rule of law, which leads them into economic backwardness.
See S. Voigt, Making Constitutions Work: Conditions for Maintaining the Rule of
Law, 18 CATO J. 191 (1998).

